This paper deals with repeated nonsymmetric congestion games in which the players cannot observe their payoffs at each stage. Examples of applications come from sharing facilities by multiple users. We show that these games present a unique Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium that dominates all other Nash equilibria and consequently it is also the social optimum among all equilibria, as it minimizes the sum of all the players' costs. We assume that the players adopt a best response strategy. At each stage, they construct their belief concerning others probable behavior, and then, simultaneously make a decision by optimizing their payoff based on their beliefs. Within this context, we provide a consensus protocol that allows the convergence of the players' strategies to the Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium. The protocol allows each player to construct its belief by exchanging only some aggregate but sufficient information with a restricted number of neighbor players. Such a networked information structure has the advantages of being scalable to systems with a large number of players and of reducing each player's data exposure to the competitors.
Introduction
The main contribution of this paper is the design of a consensus protocol (see, e.g., [3, 24] ) that allows the convergence of strategies to a Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium [2, 26] for repeated nonsymmetric congestion games under partial information.
The repeated games considered in this work are congestion games [25] as, at each stage or time period, the payoff (cost) that the ith player pays for playing a strategy is a monotonically nonincreasing function of the total number of players playing the same strategy. The games are also nonsymmetric as the payoffs are player-specific functions [22] . Finally, the games are under partial information as we assume that: each player cannot observe its payoff at each stage since the payments occur only on the long term; each player learns [30] , i.e., constructs its belief concerning other players' probable behavior, by exchanging information with a restricted number of neighbor players.
A networked information structure has the advantages of being scalable to systems with a large number of players and of reducing each player's data exposure to the competitors. On the other hand, delay in the propagation of information through the network implies that players' strategies cannot converge immediately but only after some stages.
We prove that players can learn using a consensus protocol where the quality of the information exchanged does not force the players to reveal their past decisions (see the minimal information paradigm in [11] ). In the last part of the work, we also prove that players can use linear predictors to increase the protocol speed of convergence.
Congestion games always admit at least one Nash equilibrium as established by Rosenthal in [25] . However, its efficient computation is a non trivial issue. Then, from a different perspective, we can review our results as a further attempt of providing an algorithm that finds Nash equilibria in polynomial time for special classes of congestion games [19, 30, 32] . Our results prove also that the Nash equilibrium that we find is the unique Pareto optimal one.
In addition, we prove that, in our problem, the Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium dominates all other Nash equilibria, i.e., it minimizes the cost of each player and therefore it is also social optimal, as it minimizes the social cost defined as the sum of players' costs. This is an important property as it implies that competition does not induce loss of efficiency in the system.
Examples of applications come from situations where multiple players share a service facility as airport facilities or telephone systems, drilling for oil, cooperative farming, and fishing (see also the literature on cost-sharing games [29] , and on externality games [14] ).
As motivating example, we consider a multi-retailer inventory application. The players, namely different competing retailers, share a common warehouse (or supplier) and cannot hold any private inventory from stage to stage, i.e., inventory left in excess at one stage is no longer utilizable in the future. The latter fact prevents the retailers from having large replenishment and stocks. Such a situation occurs when dealing with perishable goods as, for instance, the newspapers. Transportation is provided at the retailers' expense by the supplier at every stage, e.g., every day, but the players adjust their transportation payments with the supplier only every once in a while, e.g., once every two months.
Players aim at coordinating joint orders thus to share fixed transportation costs. As typical of repeated games, we assume that the retailers act myopically, that is, at each stage, they choose their best strategy on the basis of a payoff defined on single stage [23] . The reader is referred to [27] for a general introduction to multi-retailer inventory problems with particular emphasis on coordination among non cooperative retailers. Recent more specific examples are [4] , [6] , [7] , [13] and [31] . The role of information is discussed, e.g., in [9] and [10] . The modelling of such problems as non cooperative games is in [1] , [17] , [20] and [28] . Our idea of selecting the best (Pareto optimal) among several Nash equilibria presents some similarities with [7] , which however do not consider the possibility of sharing transportation costs. Alternative ways to achieve coordination proposed in the literature are either to centralize control at the supplier [8] and [18] , or to allow side payments [16] , and [21] .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we develop the game theoretic model of the inventory system and formally state the problem. In Section 3, we prove the existence of and characterize the unique Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium. In Section 4 we prove some stability properties of the Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium. In Section 5, we design a distributed protocol that allows the convergence of the strategies to the Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium. In Section 6, we analyze the speed of convergence of the protocol. In Section 7, we introduce a numerical example. Finally, in Section 8, we draw some conclusions.
The Inventory Game
We consider a set of n players Γ = {1, . . . , n} where each player may exchange information only with a subset of neighbor players. Hereafter, we indicate with the same symbol i both the generic player and the associated index. More formally, we assume that the set Γ induces a single component graph G = (Γ, E) whose edgeset E includes all the non oriented couples (i, j) of players that exchange information with each other. In this context, we define the neighborhood of a player i the set N i = {j : (i, j) ∈ E} ∪ {i}.
Each player i faces a customer demand and must decide whether to fulfill it or to pay a penalty p i (see it, for instance, as a missed revenue). Differently, we can review penalty p i as the cost incurred by the player when, rather than participating in the game, it fulfills the demand by turning to a different supplier. We call active player the one who decides to meet the demand. At each stage of the game, the active players receive the items required by their customer from the common warehouse. Transportation occurs only once in a stage/day, and has a total cost equal to K. The transportation cost of each stage will be divided equally by all the players active on that stage, at the moment of adjusting their transportation payments with the supplier, e.g., once every two months. As the costs do not realize immediately, the players, before playing a strategy at a given stage, need to estimate the number of active players, and they do this by exchanging information. Define the function s i (k) ∈ S i = {0, 1} as the strategy of player i, for each player i ∈ Γ, at stage k. We indicate s(k) = {s 1 (k), . . . , s n (k)} as the vector of the players' strategies and 
where s −i (k) 1 is trivially equal to the number of active players other than i.
Note that the above game is a nonsymmetric congestion game with only two strategies for each player [22] , and admits the exact Rosenthal's potential function [25] defined as Φ(s) =
is the set of active players.
For the above game, best response strategies are the only ones considered in this paper. In the case of complete information, each player i knows the other players' strategies s −i (k) and optimizes repeatedly over stages its payoff (1) choosing as best response (see, e.g., [26] ) the following threshold strategy
where the threshold l i is equal to
Incomplete information means that player i may only estimate the number s −i (k) 1 of all other active players. Note that, for the players, it is not possible to infer the number of active players from the cost as we assume that players realize their costs only in the long term and not immediately. In the rest of the paper, beingχ i (k) the estimate of s −i (k) 1 , the best response strategy (2) slightly modifies as
To computeχ i (k), at stage k, player i processes two types of public information: pre-decision information, x i (k), received from the neighbor players in N i , and post-decision information, z i (k), transmitted to the neighbor players. The information evolves according to a distributed protocol Π = {φ, h i i ∈ Γ} defined by the following dynamic equations:
where the functions φ i (·) and h i (·) are to be designed in Section 5.
The protocol must be such thatχ i (k) can be inferred from the converging value of the pre-decision information x i (k). If this is true, then player i selects its strategy s i (k) = µ i (x i (k)) on the basis of the only pre-decision information.
In the rest of the paper we always refer to (3) as when we consider a best response strategy.
We consider the following problem. (4)- (5) Observe that all results presented in the rest of the paper require only that the strategies are binary and have a threshold structure. Therefore the structure of the payoff can be relaxed as long as the best responses maintain a threshold structure as defined in (2)-(3).
Problem 1 Given the n-player repeated inventory game with binary strategies
Let us show an example in which the game under consideration may arise. 
To choose whether to reorder or not the newsboy compares the costs or reordering (6) with the penalty for not satisfying the demand (7) . As a consequence, he will reorder only if the number of newsboys sharing the set up cost n i verifies
The right-hand term plays the role of threshold l i in the inventory game under concern.
A Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium
The game under consideration always has a Nash equilibrium because it is a congestion game [25] . In this section we prove that there exists a unique Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium and we describe its characteristics. To this end, here and in the rest of the paper, we make, without loss of generality, the following assumptions:
Assumption 2 There may exist other players i = n+1, n+2, . . . not included in Γ, all of them with thresholds l i = ∞.
Assumption 3
The players in the empty subset of Γ have thresholds
The last assumption is obviously artificial, but simplifies the proofs of most results in the rest of the paper. Indeed, such an assumption allows us to prove the theorems without the necessity of introducing different arguments in the case when the set of active players is empty.
Characterization of Nash equilibria
In a Nash equilibrium s = {s 1 , . . . , s n }, each player i selects a strategy s i such that
Hence, from (2), we obtain the following equilibrium conditions
On the basis of (9), we can state the following property of any Nash Equilibrium. (9) and
However, condition (9) and
But this last inequality is in contradiction with (10) since
A complementary argument can be used to prove item ii). 2
Let us now introduce two definitions.
In a compatible set C, each player finds convenient to meet the demand if all other players in C do the same.
Definition 2 A set C ⊆ Γ of cardinality |C| = r is complete if it contains all the first r players, with r ≥ 0, i.e., C = {1, . . . , r}.
Note that C = ∅ is both a complete and a compatible set.
Theorem 1 The vector of strategies s , defined as
is a Nash equilibrium if and only if the set C = {1, . . . , r} ⊆ Γ is both complete and compatible and the following condition holds
PROOF. Sufficiency. Assume that s , defined as in (11), is a Nash equilibrium. Observe that if C = ∅ then it is complete and compatible by definition. Otherwise, C is complete by Lemma 1 and compatible by definition of a Nash equilibrium. Finally, note that if C = Γ, condition (12) holds since l n+1 = ∞. Otherwise, condition (12) holds since the player r + 1 ∈ C chooses a strategy s r+1 = 0 that, together with (9), implies l r+1 > s −(r+1) 1 = r. Necessity. Assume that C is complete and compatible and that condition (12) holds. Observe that
and therefore s i = 1 holds, for all players i ∈ C, since C is compatible. Then note that, since C is complete, all i ∈ C are such that i > r. From condition (12) we also have
From Theorem 1 we derive the following corollary.
Corollary 1 There always exists a Nash equilibrium
where C is the maximal compatible set.
PROOF. First observe that the set C always exists since it may possibly be the empty set. With Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 in mind, we show that if C is maximal then it is also complete. Assume by contradiction that C is not complete. Let player i be in C and player i − 1 be not in C.
< |C| which in turn implies that also C ∪ {i − 1} is a compatible set in contradiction with the maximality hypothesis on C. Now, assume that C is equal to {1, . . . , r}. Since C is maximal, C ∪ {r + 1} is not compatible, so l r+1 > r, i.e., condition (12) . Then, even for C ⊂ Γ, the hypotheses of Theorem 1 hold true, and the vector of strategies s , defined in (13) is a Nash equilibrium. Note that due to Assumptions 2 and 3 the above reasoning applies also to the cases C = ∅ and C = Γ. 2
Observe that, if C is the maximal compatible set, it trivially holds
The following example shows that two Nash equilibria may exist, only one associated to the maximal compatible set as defined in (13). 
Tab. 1 about here
The maximal compatible set C = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} and the associated Nash equilibrium s
Pareto optimality is evident as any deviation from this equilibrium is disadvantageous for at least one player. Also we have another complete and compatible set, C = {1, 2, 3}, that verifies (12) and is therefore associated to a second Nash equilibrium s
Characterization of the Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium
A vector of strategiesŝ = {ŝ 1 , . . . ,ŝ n } is Pareto optimal if there is no other vector of strategies s such that
where the strict inequality is satisfied by at least one player.
We say that an equilibriumŝ = {ŝ 1 , . . . ,ŝ n } dominates all the other equilibria if, for all equilibria s, it is such that
Trivially, if there exists an equilibrium that dominates all other equilibria then it is also social optimal as it verifies,
In other words, a social optimal Nash equilibrium is the one among all the Nash equilibria that minimizes the social cost defined as the sum of all the players' costs. However, note there may exist vectors of strategies different from equilibria that induce a smaller cost for the same social cost.
Theorem 2 Let s be the Nash equilibrium associated to the maximal com-
• Pareto optimality. The Nash equilibrium s is Pareto optimal;
• Uniqueness. The Nash equilibrium s is the unique Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium.
• Social optimality. The Nash equilibrium s is social optimal.
PROOF. Pareto optimality. We show that Nash equilibrium s is Pareto optimal since any other vector of strategies s induces a worse payoff for at least one player. In the Nash equilibrium s , each i ∈ C gets a payoff
consider the vector of strategies s. Define D = {i ∈ C : s i = 0} as the set of players with l i < |C| that are not active in s and E = {i ∈ C : s i = 1} as the set of players with l i ≥ |C| that are active in s. Trivially, D ∪ E = ∅ as s = s . We deal with E = ∅ and E = ∅ separately.
as C is the maximal compatible sets. The latter condition trivially holds also when D = ∅ since, in this case, each player i ∈ E incurs in a higher payoff
Uniqueness and social optimality. We prove the uniqueness and the social optimality of the Pareto optimal Nash Equilibrium by showing that it dominates all the other equilibria. Consider a generic Nash equilibrium s associated to a complete and compatible set C different form C. for all i, there exists two Pareto optimal Nash equilibria with equal payoff. They are associated respectively to the maximal compatible set C and to the empty set. In the rest of the paper, only the equilibrium s associated to the maximal compatible set C will be called the Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium.
Stability of Nash equilibria
In this section, we assume that at each stage k of the repeated game, each player i knows the number of active players at the previous stage, setsχ i (k) = s −i (k − 1) 1 and applies the best response strategy (3) . In this context, we prove that the Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium s is stable with respect to its neighborhood of strategies s such that s ≥ s componentwise. On the basis of this result, in the next section, we will be able to study the convergence properties of the repeated inventory game. Under the above hypothesis on χ i (k), the best response strategy (3) yields the following dynamic model
Given an equilibrium s and the associated complete and compatible set C = {1, . . . , r}, we define a positive (negative) perturbation at stage 0, the vector
. In other words, a positive (negative) perturbation is a change of strategies of a subset of players In the following, we introduce some theorems concerning the stability of Nash equilibria with respect to positive perturbation. The motivation for analyzing positive perturbations stems from the fact that, as we will show later on, maximal stability with respect to positive perturbations is a property that distinguishes the Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium from all other Nash equilibria. We will exploit the above property in the consensus protocol to force the convergence of the strategies to the Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium. In the previous theorem, it is immediate to observe that playerĵ may exist only forĵ ≥ r + 2, since condition (12) of Theorem 1 imposes l r+1 ≥ r + 1. In addition, lĵ =ĵ − 1 since for all i such that r < i <ĵ there holds l i ≥ i by minimality ofĵ.
Given a Nash equilibrium s , Theorem 3 establishes that s is stable with respect to any positive perturbation ∆s(0) if a playerĵ = arg min{i ∈ Γ \ C : For the sake of clarity we computeĵ and simulate dynamics on strategies for the system of Example 2. 
Tab. 2 about here
In Table 2 
Tab. 3 about here
Assuming that there exists playerĵ = arg min{i ∈ Γ\C : l i < i}, the following theorem addresses the case ||∆s(0)|| 1 =ĵ − r − 1. PROOF. Let us initially observe that, due to the minimality ofĵ,î is less than or equal toĵ − 1. Ifî =ĵ − 1 then condition i) holds since it defines an empty set. Sufficiency. We first prove condition i). For doing so, let the perturbed set P be equal to {r + 1, . . . ,ĵ − 1} then s r+1 (0) = . . . = sĵ −1 (0) = 1, which implies, at stage k = 1, s r+1 (1) = . . . = sˆi −1 (1) = 1, sĵ(1) = . . . = s 2ĵ−î−1 (1) = 1. Actually, each player i such that r +1 ≤ i ≤î−1 observes that at the previous stage, k = 0, otherĵ − 2 ≥ l i players are active and each player i such that j ≤ i ≤ 2ĵ −î − 1 observes that otherĵ − 1 = l i players are active. Similarly, at stage k = 2, it surely holds that s r+1 (2) = . . . = sĵ −1 (2) = 1. Hence, from such a stage on, the players r + 1, . . . ,ĵ − 1 surely decide to meet the demand on at least the even stages, and therefore s is not stable. It is left to prove condition ii). Let the perturbed set P be equal to {r + 1, . . . ,î − 1,ĵ + 1, . . . , 2ĵ −î} then s r+1 (0) = . . . = sˆi −1 (0) = 1 and sĵ +1 (0) = . . . = s 2ĵ−î (0) = 1, which implies, at stage k = 1, s r+1 (1) = . . . = sĵ(1) = 1. Actually, each player i such that r +1 ≤ i ≤î−1 observes that at the previous stage, k = 0, otherĵ − 2 ≥ l i players are active and each player i such that i ≤ i ≤ĵ observes that otherĵ − 1 = l i players are active. For an analogous reason, from stage k = 2 on, the players r + 1, . . . ,ĵ surely decide to meet the demand at every stage and strategies converge to a new Nash equilibrium different from s . Necessity. Assume that condition i) and condition ii) do not hold. Then the set Γ includes at most 2ĵ −î − 1 players and the threshold of the last player must satisfy the following condition l 2ĵ−î−1 >ĵ −1. Then, given a perturbation ∆s(0) with ||∆s(0)|| 1 =ĵ−r−1, at stage k = 1 it holds s i (1) = 1 for i such that either i <î or l i =ĵ −1 but i ∈ P , s i (1) = 0 otherwise. Assume without loss of generality that all i such that l i =ĵ−1 but i ∈ P are smaller than the minimum i such that l˜i =ĵ − 1 andĩ ∈ P , then the maximum number of active players at stage k = 1 may be obtained for P = {r + 1, . . . ,î − 1,ĵ, . . . , 2ĵ −î − 1}. Indeed, by doing this, we preserve all players i with threshold l i =ĵ − 1 from being perturbed at k = 0. Having chosen such a P , the number of active players at stage k = 1 is equal tô j −1. Indeed, all players i =î, . . . ,ĵ −1 have thresholds l i =ĵ −1 and therefore sˆi(1) = . . . = sĵ −1 (1) = 1. At the same time, all players i =ĵ, . . . , 2ĵ −î − 1, whose thresholds are l i ≥ĵ − 1 observe only otherĵ − 2 active players and therefore sĵ(1) = . . . = s 2ĵ−î−1 (1) = 0. Now, at stage k = 2, we have sˆi(2) = . . . = sĵ −1 (2) = 0 and s 2ĵ−î−1 (2) = 0, since l 2ĵ−î−1 >ĵ − 1. The situation at k = 2 is equivalent to the one obtainable at k = 0 in presence of a perturbation with ||∆s(0)|| 1 =ĵ − r − 2. Since for perturbations with ||∆s(0)|| <ĵ − r − 1, see Theorem 3, the Nash equilibrium s is stable, we can affirm that even in this case the strategies will converge to the Nash equilibrium s . 2 Now, we specialize the previous theorems to the Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 4 Consider a Nash equilibrium s associated to a set

Corollary 2 The unique Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium is maximally stable with respect to positive perturbations.
PROOF. From definition of maximal stability, we must show that s is stable with respect to the maximal positive perturbation ∆s(0), with ∆s(0) 1 = |Γ−C|. From maximality of C it must hold l i ≥ i for all i, such that r < i < n. As a consequence, see Theorem 3, s is stable with respect to ∆s(0) and therefore it is also maximally stable. 2 Let us conclude this section remarking that the Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium may not be globally stable with respect to negative perturbations. It is straightforward to prove this fact when, e.g., several Nash equilibria exist. Consider, for instance, the Nash equilibrium s 1 = {1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0 , 0} of Example 2: any negative perturbation (any of the players 1-6 selects 0 instead of 1) makes the strategies converge to the second equilibrium s 2 .
A Consensus Protocol
In this section, we exploit the stability properties introduced in the previous section to design a protocol Π = {φ i , h i , i ∈ Γ} that allows the distributed convergence of the best response strategies (3) to the Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium.
Consider the graph G induced by the set of players Γ as defined in Section 2. Let L be the Laplacian matrix of G and use L ij and L i• to denote respectively the i, j entry and the i-th row of L. Let us consider the almost-linear protocol Π defined by the following dynamics:
where α is a negative scalar such that the eigenvalues of the matrix (I + αL) are inside the unit circle, except for the largest one that is equal to one. We will show that the pre-decision information x i (k) in (19) is a local estimate of the percentage of the active players at each stage k − 1. The post-decision information z i (k) in (20) updates the estimate in the light of the strategy
Almost linearity is due to the non linear correcting term δ T (k) acting any T stages in (19) . This term describes the use of linear predictors, which will be discussed in Section 6.1. There, we will show that, when using linear predictors, the presence of a non null δ T increases the speed of convergence of the protocol. We will also emphasize this last argument in the numerical example of Section 7. Throughout this section, we disregard this term by assuming δ T (k) constantly equal to 0.
In the following we introduce two lemmas. The first one states that, at each stage k, the average value Avg(
is the percentage of active players at the previous stage k − 1. The second lemma states that if no player changes its strategy for a sufficient number of stages the pre-decision information x i (k) converges to the Avg(x(k) ). For this last reason, protocol Π may also be referred to as an average consensus protocol (see, e.g., [24] ). Now, let us initially rewrite the dynamic of the pre-decision information (19) for k ≥ 1 as
To obtain the second term of (22) we substitute in (19) the value of z i (k) in (20) . Then we observe that from (19) it holds x(1) = s(0) + αLs(0) hence, by induction, if we assume
Ls(r), we obtain the last term of (22) . (19) , (20) and (21) at each stage k, the following condition holds
Lemma 2 Given the dynamic of the pre-decision and the post-decision information vectors as described in
PROOF. Consider the pre-decision information vector x(k) as expressed in (22) . Then, observe that 1 L = 0. Hence, 1 (19) , (20) and (21) PROOF. We extend to the discrete-time system (22) the results established for continuous-time systems in [24] . In particular, when no players change strategy for k > r, we have s i (k) − s i (k − 1) = 0 and the system (22) is equivalent to
Lemma 3 Consider the dynamic of the pre-decision and the post-decision information vectors as described in
Given the discrete-time system above, there existsr ≥ 0 such that, for each player i, x i (r) = Avg(x(r +r)) = s(r+r−1) 1 n = Avg(x(r + 1)) (see, e.g., Corollary 1 in [24] ). 2
In the assumption that no player changes strategy from a generic stage r on, the above arguments guarantee that each player i may estimate the percentage of the active players in a finite number of stages T . Lemma 3 shows that T is finite and precisely T ≤r − r. It will be shown in Section 6, that T ≤ 2n in presence of linear predictors. At stage r + T player i estimates the number of all other active players aŝ
Now, assume that players can change strategy only at stagesk = qT , q = 0, 1, 2, . . .. At stagesk ≥ 1, we can generalize (25) 
At stagek = 0 let the players estimate all the other players active, i.e.,χ i (0) = n − 1.
Theorem 5
The average consensus protocol Π defined in (19) , (20) and (21) allows the best response strategy (3) to converge in (n − 1)T stages to the unique Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium.
PROOF. Initially observe that no player changes its strategy at stages k = qT . Then note that the best response strategy, sampled at stagesk, evolves as
Such a dynamic is exactly as in (18) . The hypothesisχ i (0) = n − 1 implies that, at stagek = 0, the initial strategy s(0) ≥ s with ∆s(0) 1 ≤ |Γ \ C|.
Since (18) is maximally stable with respect to positive perturbations even the system of the sampled strategies will converge to the Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium. The system of sampled strategies converges in at most n−1 stages. Actually, assume that the Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium is associated to C = ∅. Then, in the worst case, at stagek = 0, n − 1 players decide to meet the demand and at each successive stagek = qT only a single player changes its strategy and decide not to meet the demand any more. 2
Note that the convergence properties of the protocol established in the previous theorem still hold for any initial estimate z i (0) in (21) that is an upper bound of the |C|.
Let us finally observe that the value of T depends on the information available to the players. If, at each stage k, each player can infer the number of active players either because it is connected with all the other players or because it can observe the costs, then T = 1 and the system converge to the Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium in n − 1 stages. We discuss the value of T for more generic situations in the following section.
6 A-priori information and speed of convergence of the protocol
In this section, we determine the values of both α and T as functions of the players' computation capabilities and their knowledge about the structure of graph G. We show that T grows linearly with n when players can use linear predictors and discuss the non linear correcting term δ T (k) in (19) . Differently, in absence of linear predictors (δ T (k) = 0 for all k) the players must wait that the pre-decision information converges to the desired percentage of currently active players. In this latter case the number of stages T may become proportional to n 2 log(n) or even to n 3 log(n) depending on the knowledge that players have on the eigenvalues of the Laplacian matrix L. Throughout this section we recall the hypotheses of Lemma 3, i.e., players are interested in determining the value of Avg(s(r)) = Avg(x(r + 1)) and do not change strategy from stage r on.
Linear Predictors
With focus on (19) the non-linear correcting term must i) compensate the linear dynamics
and ii) correct the estimate of the percentage of active players. For doing so, the non linear correction may take the form
Now, we show that it is possible to design ρ linearly as follows
where γ k are the coefficients of the characteristic polynomial of the matrix I + αL and therefore depend on the structure of graph G [12] . The next theorem shows that each player i may determine the value of Avg(x(r+ 1)) in n − 1 stages.
Theorem 6
Given the protocol Π as in (19) , (20) and (21) 
An immediate consequence of the above theorem is that, in the worst case, no other distributed protocol may determine the number of active players faster than Π, provided that players know the characteristic polynomial of the matrix I + αL. If G is a path graph, the value of T can never be less than n, since information takes n − 1 stages to propagate end to end all over the path. Now, consider the case in which the players have no knowledge on the structure of the graph G, then the values of the parameters γ k cannot be a priori fixed. The next theorem proves that 2n stages are sufficient for the generic player to estimate Avg(x(r + 1)).
Theorem 7
Given the protocol Π as in (19) , (20) and (21) , the number of stages necessary to estimate the percentage of active players is at most 2n, i.e., x i (r + T ) = s(r) 1 n with T ≤ 2n for all players i ∈ Γ and for any generic stage r ≥ 0.
PROOF. Consider the generic player i and follow the same line of reasoning of the proof of Theorem 7. From Theorem 7 we know that player i can express the value of Avg(x(r + 1)) as a linear combination of the value of the predecision information available at stages r, . . . , r +n−1, that is Avg(x(r +1)) = n−1 k=0 γ k x i (r + k). However, in this case, since the structure of the graph G is not known, player i cannot a-priori fix the values of the coefficients γ k . Nevertheless, under the hypothesis that no player changes its strategy form stage r on, we know that Avg(x(r +1)) = Avg(x(r +2)) = . . . = Avg(x(r +n)) by Lemma 2. Then the following set of n + 1 conditions must hold
. . . . . . . . .
Condition (31) derives straightforward from
Set the unknown value of Avg(x(r + 1)) equal to −γ n , collect sample data of the pre-decision information in the coefficient matrix X and rewrite (31) as
When the coefficient matrix in (32) is not singular, player i can easily determine both the desired value Avg(x(r + 1)) and the coefficients γ k . On the contrary, singularity of X implies that system (32) 
No Predictors
We now compare the previous results with the ones obtainable when no predictors are used.
Lemma 3 states that, in any case, the pre-decision information converges to the desired average value Avg(s(r)) = Avg(x(r + 1)). We are then interested in deriving after how many stages a player can determine Avg(x(r + 1)) by rounding the pre-decision information currently available. To this end let us consider the following autonomous discrete time system of order n
System (33) describes the evolution of the pre-decision information when players do not change their strategies from stage r on. Actually, equation (33) is trivially equivalent to (22) when the players' strategies are disregarded. Starting from any initial state x(r +1) the system (33) converges to Avg(x(r + 1)). Then, observe that Avg(x(r + 1)) must be equal to a multiple of 1 n due to its physical meaning. As a consequence, we could choose T as equal to the minimal k such that |x i (k + r + 1) − Avg(x(r + 1))| <
2n
for each player i and let the players determining Avg(x(r + 1)) by simply rounding x i (k + r + 1) to its closest multiple of 1 n . To determine the value of T , consider first the modal decomposition of the undriven response of system (33) given by
where, for i = 1, . . . , n,λ i is an eigenvalue of I + αL, v i is the associate eigenvector, and β i depends on the initial state according to
Note that since the smallest eigenvalue of L is always λ 1 = 0, thenλ 1 = 1 and hence β 1 v 1 = Avg(x(r + 1)). Note also that I + αL is symmetric then, due to the spectral theorem for Hermitian matrices, all its eigenvectors are orthonormal. Hence,
We can now state that (subscript ∞ is dropped)
whereλ is the eigenvalue of I + αL with the second greatest absolute value. Indeed, the eigenvalue of I + αL with the greatest absolute value isλ 1 . Given the above arguments a conservative condition on T is to impose |λ|
, from which we obtain
In condition (34) T depends indirectly on the value of α through the eigenvaluê λ. In the following we discuss how to choose α in order to minimize T and, at the same time, to guarantee the stability of system (33). In (34), T is minimized if |λ| is minimum, since |λ| < 1 for system (33) to be stable. Note that |λ| is equal
The optimal α is then the solution of the following equation
It is easy to show that the solutions of the above equation are
Consider now the stability of system (33). System (33) is stable if |λ i | < 1, i = 2, . . . , n, which in turns implies that |1 + αλ i | < 1. Since α < 0 and λ i > 0, the latter condition is certainly satisfied if and only if 1 + αλ n > −1. From this last inequality, system (33) is stable if and only if − 2 λ n < α < 0. In this context, note that − 2 λn < α < 0. Let us now introduce the following lemma that collects well-known properties on the eigenvalues λ 2 and λ n that turn useful in the rest of the section. The interested reader is referred to [5] , [12] , and [15] for the proofs of the lemma.
Lemma 4 Let G 1 = (Γ, E 1 ) and G 2 = (Γ, E 2 ) be two connected graphs on the same set of vertices Γ, and let λ 2 (G 1 ) and λ 2 (G 2 ) the second smallest eigenvalues of the Laplacian matrices associated to G 1 and G 2 , respectively. Analogously, let λ n (G 1 ) and λ n (G 2 ) the greatest eigenvalues of the Laplacian matrices associated to G 1 and G 2 , respectively. Then, the following properties hold An immediate consequence of the previous lemma is that, if players know λ 2 and λ n and the graph G is complete, then α = − 1 n ,λ = 0, and from (34) we have T = 1, whereas if G is a path graph, α = − 1 2 ,λ = cos( π n ), and hence T → 2n 2 log(2(n−1)n) π 2 + 1 as n increases. Differently, if players know neither the structure of the graph G nor the eigenvalues λ 2 and λ n . To guarantee the stability of system (33), condition − 2 λn < α < 0 must hold for any possible value of λ n . By Lemma 4, the largest λ n occurs when G is a complete graph, where λ n = n. Then, α must be chosen within the interval − 2 n < α < 0. Now, consider a path graph. The fastest convergence occurs for the greatest |α|, and when α → − 2 n we obtain T → n 3 log(2(n−1)n) 2π 2 + 1 as n increases.
Simulation Results
In this section we provide a numerical example and some simulation results for a set Γ of 8 players implementing the designed protocol with and without predictors. We will see that in both cases the strategies converge to the Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium though with different speed of convergence. Fig. 1 reports the induced graph G, whereas Tab. 4 lists the players' thresholds l i and the initial strategies s i (0). Note that at k = 0 the strategies are not in the Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium s * = {1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}. (26)- (27) . Fig. 3 shows the evolution of the pre-decision information when the linear predictors are not present. Both Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 show that at k = 0 players 1 − 2 − 3 − 4 − 5 are active.
Differently, players 6 − 7 − 8 are not active, as they can immediately estimate that the number of active players is below their threshold values. At stage k = T all the players estimate the number of active players as equal to 5. In particular, player 5 observes other four active players and since its threshold is l 1 = 5 it changes strategy from s 1 (T − 1) = 1 to s 1 (T ) = 0 (circles in Fig. 2-3 ). At k = 2T , the players' new estimate is 4 and player 4 changes strategy, too. Finally, at stage k = 3T , the players strategies converge to the Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium with s 1 = 3. The difference between the two figures is that, in Fig. 2 the value of T is 15 whereas in Fig. 3 the value of T is 80. In this paper, we have introduced a consensus protocol to achieve distributed convergence to a Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium, for a class of repeated nonsymmetric congestion games under partial information. We have specialized the game to a multi-retailer application, where transportation or set up costs are shared among all retailers, reordering from a common warehouse. The main results concern: i) the existence and the stability of Pareto optimal Nash equilibria, ii) the structure of the consensus protocol and its convergence properties. Table 1 Players' thresholds and initial strategies Table 2 Stability of s 2 for ∆s(0) 1 = 1. Table 3 Instability of s 2 for ∆s(0) 1 = 3. Table 4 Players' thresholds and initial strategies
